# An Onchain Implementation Of Mining Feerate Futures

**URL:** <https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/an-onchain-implementation-of-mining-feerate-futures/547>\
**Category:** Protocol Design\
**Created:** [February 12, 2024, 11:15am UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/an-onchain-implementation-of-mining-feerate-futures/547 "2024-02-12T11:15:33Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 5

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**Author:** ![ajtowns](https://delvingbitcoin.org/user_avatar/delvingbitcoin.org/ajtowns/32/417_2.png) [@ajtowns](https://delvingbitcoin.org/u/ajtowns)\
**Post date:** [February 19, 2024, 9:40am UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/an-onchain-implementation-of-mining-feerate-futures/547/5 "2024-02-19T09:40:13Z")

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> [@harding](#):
>
> a miner with a large percentage of total network hashrate can forgo mining a transaction in a particular block and still have a realistic chance of being able to mine that transaction in one of their later blocks. … I suspect that widespread use of this contract might make large miners even more profitable than smaller miners, increasing centralization of mining

I don’t think that’s true? If a miner mines the low feerate “miner tx” before it expires, leaving some random higher feerate txs in the mempool, that raises the fees available in the next block for _everyone_ including low hashrate miners. So I think that actually gives an advantage to low-hashrate miners: they get the benefit of an occassional bonus high feerate tx, without having to pay the cost of having mined a low feerate tx first.

That is: yes, there is an incentive for large miners to behave **differently** to small miners, but that difference benefits whoever finds future blocks equally, whether they participated in the strategy or not, whether they’rea small miner or a large one.

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