Changes to BIP-360 - Pay to Quantum Resistant Hash (P2QRH)

Whether or not DL opcodes are disabled, users will need somewhere to move their funds to once they become aware and concerned about quantum attack - Whether that occurs in a year or a decade or longer, we need an option ready.

Disabling key-path spending on P2TR is just as technically viable an option as BIP360, but if our long-term plan is P2TR without key-paths, this comes with some UX and DX problems:

  • Once QCs are around, how do wallets prevent users from sending funds to quantum-vulnerable addresses, if they look exactly the same as quantum-resistant addresses?
  • Before QCs are around, how do users know if their P2TR wallet actually has quantum-resistant leafs attached? A legacy P2TR wallet would mostly look and act exactly the same as a P2TR wallet which has post-quantum leafs. Users would need assurance from the wallet maintainers or to read the source code themselves.
  • Naive users who have funds in P2TR may hear “P2TR is now quantum secure” and falsely believe their UTXOs are safe and that no action is needed.
  • Bitcoin client authors must now maintain secp256k1 code indefinitely - tap-tweaking the internal key becomes a required step to spend bitcoin even in a post-quantum world.

As for disabling EC opcodes, I am personally in favor of eventually placing a temporary restriction on them, pending a ZK-STARK soft fork which re-unlocks them. See this mailing list thread for info. But certainly that kind of change should not be concurrent with BIP360’s deployment, as it would prevent people from migrating to P2QRH, and as Ethan hinted, it’d also needlessly embroil a perfectly valid BIP in a contentious debate.

Whatever your stance on freeze/not-freeze/zk-starks, we can all agree we need addresses people can migrate towards which are definitively quantum resistant.

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