# Changes to BIP-360 - Pay to Quantum Resistant Hash (P2QRH)

**URL:** <https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/changes-to-bip-360-pay-to-quantum-resistant-hash-p2qrh/1811>\
**Category:** Protocol Design\
**Tags:** post-quantum, announcement, softfork\
**Created:** [July 7, 2025, 4:01pm UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/changes-to-bip-360-pay-to-quantum-resistant-hash-p2qrh/1811 "2025-07-07T16:01:15Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 30

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**Author:** ![vazertuche](https://delvingbitcoin.org/user_avatar/delvingbitcoin.org/vazertuche/32/593_2.png) [@vazertuche](https://delvingbitcoin.org/u/vazertuche)\
**Post date:** [September 23, 2025, 8:48pm UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/changes-to-bip-360-pay-to-quantum-resistant-hash-p2qrh/1811/30 "2025-09-23T20:48:55Z")

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P2TR with a NUMS point is not quantum resistant. A CRQC can break the tweaked key on chain whether it is aware the primary path is using a NUMS point or not. Interestingly enough, if a quantum computer did this, it would provide cryptographically provable evidence that a quantum computer exist and has stolen these funds. (or that EC crypto is broken) The user who’s wallet was stolen would simply need to reveal a valid script path spend along with the NUMS point and any outside observer should be fully convinced a quantum computer broke the tweaked key and stole the funds.

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_[View the full topic](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/changes-to-bip-360-pay-to-quantum-resistant-hash-p2qrh/1811)._
