Disposing of "dust attack" UTXOs

Since it has not been mentioned, I feel it should be brought up in the “Security Considerations” section that wallets SHOULD NOT enable such a dust disposal function for UTXOs if there are “real” unspent funds on the same address, especially if a) no funds have previously been spent from the address and b) it is an address type with a hashed public key.

Rationale being that even if you don’t want to consolidate your real funds with the dust, disposing of said dust without moving the real funds first would reveal the public key for the address, which would make the real funds vulnerable in a hypothetical future where CRQCs capable of long-exposure attacks against 256-bit ECDLP public keys exist. In such a future, I could see attackers sending dust to wallets specifically to attempt tricking people into disposing of dust in order to reveal their public key, thus enabling such an attack.

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