# Ephemeral Anchors and MEVil

**URL:** <https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/ephemeral-anchors-and-mevil/383>\
**Category:** Protocol Design\
**Tags:** mempool\
**Created:** [January 8, 2024, 5:11pm UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/ephemeral-anchors-and-mevil/383 "2024-01-08T17:11:16Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 15

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**Author:** ![instagibbs](https://delvingbitcoin.org/user_avatar/delvingbitcoin.org/instagibbs/32/28_2.png) [@instagibbs](https://delvingbitcoin.org/u/instagibbs)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2024, 1:16pm UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/ephemeral-anchors-and-mevil/383/15 "2024-02-20T13:16:12Z")

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> [@Crypt-iQ](#):
>
> Is this issue here that the party in control of `TxB` is paying 1,780 sats over the “pure burn” ephemeral anchor spend to evict `TxC` rather than a separate transaction paying \> 10,000 sats per rule #3 (thereby saving money and incentivizing inflating the anchor)?

Basically yes. You can make it further obvious by driving up the ephemeral value.

> [@Crypt-iQ](#):
>
> If we start with 0-value outputs but still want to keep the commitment transaction 0-fee, couldn’t we add an anyone-can-spend output that’s timelocked far in the future (and hence won’t interfere with anything in the mempool)?

Yes

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