# Mempool Incentive Compatibility

**URL:** <https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/mempool-incentive-compatibility/553>\
**Category:** Protocol Design\
**Created:** [February 13, 2024, 2:06am UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/mempool-incentive-compatibility/553 "2024-02-13T02:06:15Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 16

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**Author:** ![rustyrussell](https://delvingbitcoin.org/user_avatar/delvingbitcoin.org/rustyrussell/32/154_2.png) [@rustyrussell](https://delvingbitcoin.org/u/rustyrussell)\
**Post date:** [February 26, 2024, 5:19am UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/mempool-incentive-compatibility/553/16 "2024-02-26T05:19:43Z")

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Actually, thinking about this overnight, I realized the DoS caused by carving out the “total fees” rule for block 1 entry is less than the one we already have.

You can already play the “free relay” game at the bottom of the mempool. In this case, there are three outcomes:

1. Fees go up, you get evicted, you win a Free Relay.
2. Fees go don’t go up, you don’t get to play this round.
3. Fees go down for long enough, your tx gets mined, you lose.

The same game played on the 1-block boundary (with the Next Block Carvout) is worse:

1. Fees go up, you get evicted, you win.
2. Fees don’t go up, you get mined, you lose.

In addition, this game is _more expensive_ than the tail-of-mempool game.

Unfortunately, you can play both games, so strictly speaking it does make the DoS opportunity greater. But it’s a fairly strong argument that this does not make it significantly worse, either.

This is a fair way out of my expertise, though: have I missed anything?

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