Mempool Incentive Compatibility

This was the link I was looking for earlier, thanks!!

We need to consider three things here:

  • Bandwidth consumption
  • Higher layer protocol efficacy
  • Miner incentives

I think we’ve demonstrated a conflict between them (i.e. we need to compromise, and we implicitly are already).

I don’t think your example works for lightning today, where the first transaction is of fixed size, so games can only be played with the children, and v3 restricts those.

But it does effect a general stackable-txs case, which is where we’re headed eventually, so must be considered. Sigh, ok

The real problem in your example seems to be step 7: by RBF not considering the package feerate, but a single tx feerate, it discards an imminent tx! This is not incentive compatible if you assume any reasonable discount rate for future blocks?