It may have already been clear to others, but the whole idea can be reasonably generalized. Though, at this point what is being discussed may be more appropriate for the Philosophy or Economics forums?
Regardless, I tried to work up a concise but somewhat plausible example to demonstrate:
Share Issuance as a Tool for Bitcoin Alignment
Example: Hard Money Coffee
Different choices of the issuance function S(D_sharechain) which may even depend on other inputs so long as they are “consensus observable” from the perspective of a sharechain node, can be experimented with on a per-sharechain or per-project basis, without impacting Bitcoin consensus. Such endeavors need only publicly commit to a simple policy such as: all net profits will be used to either (a) mine-then-burn or (b) buy-then-burn shares of that sharechain.
This policy is then enforced indirectly via market mechanisms around the sharechain ecosystem, which is a subset of the Bitcoin ecosystem.
As a concrete example, imagine a global decentralized coffee phenomenon, Hard Money Coffee (“HMC”), launching its own sharechain. At genesis, a large block of shares which are, initially, ineligible for the “select a random share” mechanism, could be created and assigned to a multi-sig “operations” address controlled by founders and/or stewards. These “operations shares” would function much like startup equity: they could be pledged as collateral to obtain working capital (ideally in sats of course, but also potentially as machinery, leases, or other contributions), while ongoing PoW mining creates a separate stream of newly issued shares according to the chosen S(D_sharechain). The ongoing mining of the sharechain as well as atomic swaps to/from Bitcoin provide a real time and globally accessible information signal about the HMC phenomenon.
Founders or stewards of HMC might still want, for liability or operational reasons, to create one or more traditional legal entities—e.g., HMC Inc., a Delaware corporation. They can capitalize such an entity with sharechain shares (so that HMC Inc. can sign contracts, pledge collateral, lease property, hire employees, etc.), while remaining bound by a public commitment such as: “HMC Inc. will use its net profits to mine/buy-then-burn HMC sharechain shares.” The legal entity then looks and acts conventional to courts and counterparties, but economically it is just a steward that channels value back into the sharechain according to this commitment. From the perspective of the sharechain protocol, however, HMC Inc. is just one node among many: it controls some share addresses and may contribute hash rate, but it has no special consensus privileges.
HMC Inc. never custodies anyone else’s sharechain shares and does not maintain any off-chain register of “anonymous” beneficial owners; ownership and transfers are tracked natively on the sharechain itself. Because the HMC sharechain is a p2share sharechain, even the occasional Bitcoin block rewards it earns are automatically and non-custodially distributed on-chain to the selected share, never touching HMC Inc.’s balance sheet, which is win‑win‑win for incentive alignment, operational efficiency, and keeping the necessary “backward compatibility” surface with legacy legal/compliance systems as small and simple as possible.
The presence of such entities does not break the model, because market pricing of sharechain shares continuously reflects the perceived probability that stewards will honor their commitments. If there is even a hint that HMC Inc.’s stewards are going rogue—for example, diverting profits away from mining or buying-and-burning shares—the market will start discounting sharechain shares. Since HMC Inc.’s balance sheet is largely composed of pre-mined, not-yet-eligible sharechain shares (plus whatever other assets it has accumulated), this discount directly erodes its apparent net worth and indirectly pressures its other assets, founders, and stewards, in addition to the reputational damage. The p2share mechanism thus gives maximal flexibility to interoperate with legacy legal structures, while preserving bitcoin-aligned incentives and providing clear, on-chain signals for detection and evaluation of risk and reward.
Crucially, those pre-mined operations shares can be made ineligible for the “select a random share” mechanism at first, via consensus rules that simply exclude them from the eligible set. A later, consensus-enforced upgrade could then make some or all of them eligible, but only once Hard Money Coffee has reached a level of profitability where it is actually following through on its public commitment to mine/buy-then-burn shares out of business profits. It is natural to expect markets to price this path-dependence: so long as the enterprise’s success and honesty are uncertain, operations shares should trade at a steep discount; as evidence mounts that the venture is profitable and is indeed burning shares as promised, the discount should narrow, with the eligibility upgrade itself likely treated as a major priced-in milestone.
Over time, if the HMC sharechain becomes widely held, heavily used, and HMC Inc. (and others) are reliably buying and burning shares out of real‑world profits, the protocol need not keep issuing large amounts of new shares. In fact, S(D_sharechain) can be designed from genesis to taper issuance toward zero as the chain matures, without relying on any discretionary off‑chain judgment about HMC Inc.’s fortunes. In such a steady state, miners are compensated primarily by fees, while buy‑and‑burn activity supports the share price and thus the value of those fees. HMC Inc. remains, from the protocol’s perspective, just one sharechain node among many that happens to hold shares and perform work; it has no special authority over issuance rules beyond what is mechanically encoded in consensus.