I’ve read the linked post, and I got confused by what you are saying. The post aludes to burning all the shares of an account (and it has an interesting case, pointing out to the possibility of dividing shares in different accounts in order to remain profitable), but now, you say about the same share winning multiple times. Maybe it is a name confusion, what is a share? Is it different from an account? Is the share the “coin” or the “account”?
In any case, I am really pro bruning the selected account shares. That’s because, if large miners doesn’t get your shares burnt, we could have a centralization of shares to fewer hands, and those miners would win all the time. If the winner is always burnt, the small miner that isn’t selected could, in theory, on the long run, accumulate shares untill it is a valid candidate to be selected.
Inflation is also somewhat of a problem. If, in the long run, sharecoins are always devaluated, shares of small miners could be outpriced and never paid. Sure, if the small miner, on the long run, is contributing little to the total hash as a whole, it is fair that the reward would shrink until the next found block.
I should also point to the possibility of large miners pulverizing their shares on multiple accounts. That would totally break the incentives, once the miner doesn’t diminish its probability on being chosen, while they guarantee to burn little to no share. Maybe we can make an account only elegible to selection after some threshold, and miners with less shares would profit by selling them to the elegible ones. Or maybe UTXOs could only be consolidated, never broken down, or frequently refreshed? It’s concerning that, even in that situation, large miners could generate multiple small sized shares and never consolidate them. Maybe the probability on being chosen could grow exponentially with share size rather than linear, so [p(s1+s2) > p(s1) + p(s2)], setting a penalty to pulverization.
Another cool feature that could be managed by sharecoin is coordination to onchain txs. Imagine some ark style payout tree, instead of needing a coordinator to manage the signatures, the sidechain itself could be a place to cordination. Multiple parties could commit asynchronously to signatures to construct such thing, using the faster pace the sidechain grows and the ephemerity of the state (nodes doesn’t need to store all history), maybe signature commitments could have some expire time for the coordination to be complete? In that way, nodes could get rid of them after some time.
PS: re-read the linked post, and now understood that you were proposing different paying models lmao. Sorry, I’m working today, early in the morning, my mind isn’t fully focused yet (and english isn’t my native language). But I remain with my point: if shares are never burnt, then we can have a centralization and smaller miners could never get paid. Also, i think the exponential probability based on share quantity is a clever way out, we could scale down the exponentiability in order to not get an explosion. Maybe something like [x log(x)] can suffice, we only need the proposition [p(s1+s2) > p(s1) + p(s2)] to be true.