[Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards : preventing miner's deviation when the Bitcoin rewards is zero

Hello Junhyuk,

I trust you are well, and thank you for your reply,

The natural first future-work item you may consider extends exactly from your “attackers can hold dark capacity too” argument:

Symmetry there is granted, a conclusion, not an assumption. However, if hidden capacity favours attack or defence can only be settled by modelling the contest: a block-level double-spend race — the next order up from the transaction-level race — which escalates into a bidding war for the capacity itself, the order above that. It is a game, and someone should model it.

The foils already exist, and they bind even if nobody does:

  • Budish (QJE 2024) models the double-spend contest with a fixed acceptance rule and no reactive defender. The doomsday bounds follow from that assumption.
  • Bonneau (FC’16) and Bonneau et al. (FC’18) model attack-capacity rental and acquisition — again with no strategic defender on the other side of the market.
  • Moroz, Aronoff, Narula & Parkes (2020) is the exception that proves the pattern: the moment the victim can counter-fork, deterrence emerges and the attack is not attempted.

Remove the defender’s move and you get collapse; restore it and you get deterrence. Your paper inherits the first family’s assumption. That is a legitimate scope choice — but it should be cited as one, because these foils bound your claims whether or not the game is in scope.

So, stated as a referee would: either model the contest, or cite these foils and state explicitly that the deviation results hold only under the no-reactive-defender assumption they share.

Kind Regards, Cameron