SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories

[ariard]

@ZmnSCPxj

If most unilateral exit costs are borne by the LSP, it has an incentive to (1) provide very good service so that clients have no desire to unilateral exit and instead do assisted exit, (2) to come online ASAP to batch at timeout maturity, to reduce the risk of accidental or deliberate unilateral exit by the LSP, and (3) be picky about its clients so that clients do not just unilaterally exit to drain the LSP of funds.

To gauge better the fault-tolerance of this construction, I think you should have an estimation of the on-chain weight units costs for a range of less than perfect interactivity situations (e.g m-of-m, m-of-m - 1, m-of-m - 2). Also any assisted exit sounds a double-edged sword mechanism as it could be leveraged to kick out a user, at the worst time e.g when the on-chain fees are full.

There is no guarantee that the LSP respects its own liquidity policy on that regard.

In order for A to exit, it must first have the A & L channel funding outpoint confirmed, then finally exit the A & L channel using standard Poon-Dryja unilateral exit. Thus, A must publish the path to its channel below:

Another question - How do you prevent A to unilaterally downgrade the construction fault-tolerance for all the subset of users intersecting with its path to its channel ? I.e A to D being partitioned from E to H.