Thanks for your reply. It is not a problem yet, at least not so far as I am aware. I will try to illustrate a contrived example:
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Receiver uses CPFP to consume the Pay2Anchor and, rather than implicitly burning to fees, instead pays a miner directly via an explicit output.
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The reason the miner likes this is that she does not need to wait 100 blocks to spend those fees.
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The reason the Receiver likes this is that he gets his transaction confirmed faster.
I can imagine a world where the receiver just creates a bunch of these CPFP transactions and submits one to each mining pool’s accelerator.
The problem is that if blocks are full and if for some bizarre reason this becomes the “normal” way of doing things, I fear that the receiver will have a false sense of security.
I think it probably only becomes an issue, if ever, when total miner fees in this “explicit output” form significantly exceed the block subsidy and implicit fees for a given block.
Then, in that situation at block height H, miners of the blocks near the tip (blocks H-1, H-2, H-3, …,) may have more incentive to reorg than they do in our current circumstances.