# V3 transaction policy for anti-pinning

**URL:** <https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/v3-transaction-policy-for-anti-pinning/340>\
**Category:** Protocol Design\
**Tags:** lightning, pinning, mempool\
**Created:** [January 2, 2024, 9:31am UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/v3-transaction-policy-for-anti-pinning/340 "2024-01-02T09:31:41Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 17

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**Author:** ![harding](https://delvingbitcoin.org/user_avatar/delvingbitcoin.org/harding/32/925_2.png) [@harding](https://delvingbitcoin.org/u/harding)\
**Post date:** [January 5, 2024, 11:11pm UTC](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/v3-transaction-policy-for-anti-pinning/340/17 "2024-01-05T23:11:33Z")

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> [@nettimel](#):
>
> miners can just efficiently spend all the anchor channel outputs together in a block. More efficient than any normal CPFP.

That’s a fair point; it does undermine my claimed advantage of a soft-fork version of ephemeral anchors.

I haven’t thought of an alternative way to obtain the property of in-band CPFP fee bumping pay the same weight cost as out-of-band transaction acceleration, at least not without preventing batching that would be beneficial to users.

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